too KWOH-kweh /tuː ˈkwoː.kwe/
You too. The criticism is returned to its sender unopened: the speaker fails to live by it, and the failure is treated as a refutation. Hypocrisy is established; falsity is merely announced.
Taxonomy - Ad hominem subtype, relevance fallacy, hypocrisy appeal. Legitimate charges of inconsistency contrast by aiming where they can land: at sincerity, authority, or practical commitment, not at truth.
Informal Example - "You say I should stop smoking, but you smoke too; therefore, your claim is false."
Canonical Form:
S asserts P ∧ Violates(S,P) ⊢ ¬P
Where:
The fallacy treats hypocrisy as a defeater of truth rather than a defeater of consistency or authority.
Invalidity Statement:
(S asserts P ∧ Violates(S,P)) ⇏ ¬P
The speaker's inconsistency does not entail the falsity of P.
Missing Necessary Condition
To refute P, the inconsistency must bear on P's truth rather than merely on S's conduct:
Rel(Violates(S,P),Truth(P))
Without that relevance relation, the objection shifts from the proposition to the person.
Fallacious Assumed Model:
Violates(S,P) → ¬P
Correct Minimal Alternative Model:
Violates(S,P) → Inconsistent(S)
Hypocrisy can establish inconsistency in the speaker without falsifying the claim asserted.
A legitimate use can challenge standing or sincerity:
Violates(S,P) ⊢ ¬Sincere(S,P)
But the fallacious use claims propositional refutation:
Violates(S,P) ⊢ ¬P
This separates criticism of the arguer's commitments from criticism of the proposition.
𝔼(Violates(S,P)) ⇏ □(¬P)
Where:
Evidence of hypocrisy may justify doubt about sincerity, but not necessarily doubt about the proposition itself.
Hypocrite With True Claim
Violates(S,P) ∧ P
A speaker may fail to live by a true principle.
Legitimate Consistency Challenge
Violates(S,P) ⊢ ¬Authority(S,P)
This may be relevant when the speaker's authority depends on integrity or practice.
Policy Independent of Advocate
BadActor(S) ∧ GoodReason(Q,P) ⊢ P
Independent reasons can support P regardless of the advocate's conduct.
Tu quoque develops as a recognizable form of ad hominem argument, aimed at an opponent's inconsistency rather than at the proposition directly.
Classical and scholastic dialectical traditions already distinguish attacks on a speaker's commitments from refutations of the thesis under discussion.
Modern informal logic treats tu quoque as fallacious when hypocrisy is used to evade the truth of the criticism, while allowing that inconsistency can matter to credibility, sincerity, or practical authority.
In contemporary argumentation theory, the central issue is the target of the objection: it may defeat a speaker's standing without defeating the proposition asserted.
© Logicae. A logic reference project.